講座題目:Controlling and Minority Shareholders Meeting Halfway? Evidence from Family FirmsVoluntary Information Disclosure on Foreign Direct Investment控股股東和小股東之間的折衷妥協?來自家族企業海外直接投資信息揭露的證據????????????

主講嘉賓:顧茜 美國佐治亞州立大學J.Mack Robinson商學院助理教授








顧茜為喬治亞州立大學助理教授。其研究興趣包括家族企業、新興市場企業戰略和對外直接投資。她的研究成果發表在ASQ、SMJJIBS等國際頂級期刊上。顧茜助理教授為Journal of World BusinessManagement and Organization review等期刊的編委會成員。



How do firms respond to the diverging demands between controlling and minority shareholders? Utilizing family firms’ newly established foreign direct investment (FDI) as a natural laboratory, we propose that firms can reconcile these shareholder demands by strategizing their voluntary information disclosure. Specifically, firms can adopt a balanced approach by adjusting the amount of information disclosure and the contents of information disclosed. When there is a higher level of controlling family involvement, there will be a larger amount of information disclosure to satisfy the needs of minority shareholders on the one hand, and a lower ratio of socioemotional wealth (SEW) sensitive information disclosed to meet the demands of the controlling families on the other hand. Furthermore, this balanced approach is modified by the social norms in the host countries. A stronger norm of minority shareholder protection will strengthen the positive effect of controlling family involvement on the amount of information disclosure, and a stronger norm of family value preservation will weaken its influence on the ratio of SEW sensitive information disclosed. Using a sample of publicly listed family firms in China, we find empirical support for our theoretical predictions.